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Abstract: Command-and-control measures, despite their inefficiencies, are still the standard
in environmental policy. This might be due to the fact that command-and-control instruments
prevent monetary redistribution between sectors and households and leave property rights on
remaining pollution with the emittents. The present paper interprets the no-redistribution
policy as a political constraint and investigates on more efficient alternatives to command-
and-control, using a computable general equilibrium model for Switzerland. Simulation
results render schemes that refund environmental tax revenues by a sector-by-sector-subsidy
on labor or output as welfare enhancing.
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21 Introduction
At the UN climate convention in Kyoto 1997, the industrialized world agreed on reducing
greenhouse gas emissions by an average of five percent down from the 1990 level over the
next fifteen years. The European Union member states committed themselves to an eight
percent reduction1. The adequacy of this goal as well as the scope for unilateral action by the
EU are not the subject matter of this paper. Rather, the focus is on the set of measures that
would allow the countries to achieve their goal.
It is well known from the economic literature that only a uniform effluent charge ensures that
a given environmental standard is achieved at minimal cost. Since a uniform rate equalizes the
marginal abatement costs across economic agents, it minimizes the total cost of an
environmental constraint. This so called price-standard-approach dates back to Baumol and
Oates (1971). Originally, there was no discussion on the use of revenues from effluent charges
as it was implicitly assumed that revenues are redistributed to households in form of a lump
sum2. In the last years though the debate on ecological tax reform highlighted the importance
of the way in which redistribution takes place. With prior tax distortions, it is more efficient to
use environmental tax revenues to finance cuts in distortionary taxes than to redistribute lump-
sum since the former allows for a lower overall excess burden of taxation in the economy. The
efficiency gain from such recycling schemes is undisputed nowadays – it is commonly
referred to as the weak double dividend of ecological tax reform (Goulder, 1995a).
Although the efficiency argument in favor of economic measures in environmental policy is
strong, such instruments constitute the exception rather than the rule in the real world.
Moreover, the measures that have been implemented do not correspond to textbook versions.
For instance, energy taxes almost always include exemptions granted for energy-intensive
sectors. This policy increases the shadow value of an environmental standard, which appears
to be - from a narrow perspective of economic efficiency – disappointing. From a political
point of view, this policy is, however, not surprising. Although economic measures such as
effluent charges do minimize the cost of an environmental standard, they also redistribute
income between economic agents to a large extent. Agents that would loose will oppose an
efficient scheme in environmental policy and may successfully prevent its realization provided
their political influence is sufficiently strong.
                                                          
1 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Annex B.
2 As an exception, see Sandmo (1975) for an early and thorough discussion of this issue within a pigouvian tax
scheme.
3The present paper considers both efficiency and political feasibility of environmental policy.
Employing a computable general equilibrium model (CGEM) for Switzerland, it investigates
on the efficiency property of different redistribution devices that compensate agents for paying
environmental taxes so that no intersectoral transfers takes place. The targeted environmental
standard is a ten percent reduction of CO2 emissions fixed in the Swiss federal bill on the
reduction of CO2 emissions3. Within this framework, the present article does not discuss
different institutional setups for environmental policy but asks for more efficient
environmental instruments given the political restrictions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview on
political environmental economics and the existing CO2-tax schemes in Europe. Section 3
discusses the efficiency of environmental tax reform subject to the political constraint that
sectors subject to the environmental tax are compensated, and introduces the tax reform
scenarios that are analyzed in this paper. Section 4 presents the Swiss CGEM and the welfare
results of different redistribution devices. Section 5 concludes.
2 Political Opposition and Existing CO2 Tax Schemes in Europe
 The central public choice aspect of environmental charges has been analyzed by Buchanan
and Tullock (1975)4. In particular, they compare the political feasibility of environmental
charges with a command-and-control approach that obliges the emittents to a uniform
reduction of their emissions5. Their main argument is based on the observation that with the
introduction of an effluent charge, pollution rights are entirely relocated from the polluters to
the government, since polluters have to pay taxes even after having reduced their emission
levels. In contrast to a tax, a command-and-control scheme leaves the pollution rights on the
remaining emissions with the polluters. Therefore, if the polluters cannot expect the tax
revenue to be paid back, they will always favor the command-and-control instrument6. If, on
the other hand, revenues were redistributed lump-sum to the polluters, they would prefer the
                                                          
3 Although Switzerland committed itself to an eight percent reduction in greenhouse gases, it unilaterally adopted
a ten percent cut in CO2 emissions.
4 See Hahn (1990) for an overview on political economy of environmental economics.
5 Note that we do not discuss or model the allocation of pollution rights to various emittents within a command-
and-control scheme but concentrate on the comparison between environmental charges and a uniform emission
reduction across sectors.
 6 Buchanan and Tullock (1975), p. 144.
4tax instrument7. These findings only apply to a situation where emissions are uniformly
distributed across polluters. If the polluters produce different quantities of emissions,
however, the effect of redistribution depends on the individual polluter’s emission level. A
uniform transfer of revenues to firms results in a redistribution from large to small polluters.
Firms with low emission levels therefore will most likely favor the tax/transfer scheme, while
large polluters still prefer to stick with the command-and-control solution. The public choice
literature suggest that small interest groups that would be heavily affected will be most
effective in influencing government policy (Olson, 1965). Thus, in an economy with relatively
few large and many small polluters, the small but strongly affected group of losers, i.e.
energy-intensive sectors, can prevail over many but weakly affected winners and therefore
prevent the introduction of environmental taxes.
 The public choice considerations explain to a large extent why the European countries that
have already introduced substantial CO2 taxes partially exempt energy-intensive sectors from
the tax8. This is true for Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Finland and the Netherlands, on the
other hand, have not established any exemptions for energy-intensive sectors. However, in
these two countries the tax rates are very moderate (38.3 Fmk and 5.16 Gld per ton CO2,
respectively) and only led to price increases in the range of a few percent9. Also, the EU
commission planned extensive tax relieves for energy-intensive sectors in its proposal for a
combined CO2/energy taxation – a proposal which has been approved by the new German
government in its plan for an ecological tax reform.
 In the bill on the reduction of CO2 emissions, the Swiss government follows its own strategy,
although it also aims at preventing large redistribution in order to minimize political
opposition against environmental policy. In particular, big emittents have the option of getting
exempted from the tax provided they commit themselves on reducing their emissions to a
negotiated level10. With such an incentive scheme in place, it can be expected that all the big
emittents will opt for an exemption in order to maintain the pollution rights on the remaining
emissions. The drawback of this policy is an efficiency loss: the marginal abatement costs will
not be equalized across sectors implying that the targeted ten percent reduction will not be
achieved at minimal cost.
                                                          
 7 In the original article by Buchanan and Tullock, there was a mistake in the derivation of this result (see the
comment by Maine and Baird, 1976).
 8 For an overview on the existing environmental taxes in Europe, see Cansier and Krumm (1997).
 9 Cansier and Krumm (1997), p. 65.
 10 Art. 9, Swiss federal bill on the reduction of CO2 emissions.
5 The existing and planned CO2-tax schemes intend to reduce political opposition at the cost of
efficiency. The trade-off between efficiency and political feasibility is fundamental and cannot
be overcome. However, the question arises as to whether existing and planned schemes are on
the efficient frontier of this trade-off or whether alternative schemes provide a better (more
efficient) solution. Buchanan and Tullock (1975, p. 143) already raised this issue: ”If the
economist ties his recommendation for the penalty tax to an accompanying return of tax
revenues to those in the industry who suffer potential capital losses, he might be more
successful than he has been in proposing unilateral or one-sided application of policy norms.
[...] a two-sided tax subsidy arrangement can remove the industry source of opposition while
still ensuring efficient results.” In the next section, we present a set of two-sided tax subsidy
arrangements which will then be evaluated using a CGEM for Switzerland.
 
3 Scenarios: The Trade-off between Efficiency and Political Feasibility
All scenarios are subject to an environmental constraint as the maximum amount of CO2
emissions is fixed. In the tax scenarios, the government owns emission permits and sells them
to the emittents, household and sectors. At the same time we assume a fixed public budget,
i.e. government will transfer revenues from CO2 permits to households and firms or cut
existing taxes11. In the first scenario, which serves as the simulations’ reference case (REF,
see Table 1), the government uses lump-sum transfers to the household in order to hold the
budget constant.
With existing distortionary taxes, a scope for environmental tax reform arises. If the
government used CO2-permits revenues to finance cuts in distortionary taxes, it would reap a
weak double dividend, i.e. an efficiency gain relative to a lump-sum redistribution12. Goulder
(1995b) calculates the size of the weak double dividend for the US. In its base case, the use of
the revenue from a $25 tax rate per ton of CO2 to reduce existing taxes diminishes the cost of
the CO2 tax by 36 to 53 percent, depending on the specific tax that is reduced13. The largest
efficiency gain is achieved when the payroll tax, the tax with the highest marginal excess
                                                          
11 Note that this approach which combines a standard where the government exclusively owns permission permits
with a redistribution of government permit revenues such that its budget remains constant is equivalent to an
environmental tax reform.
12 The strong double dividend, on the other hand, is characterized by an efficiency gain due to the introduction of
an environmental tax. Bovenberg in a series of articles (see, for example, Bovenberg and De Mooij, 1994)
showed that in general a strong double dividend cannot be reaped.
13 Goulder (1995b), p. 285.
6burden, is reduced. The second scenario (WDD) in our simulations calculates the weak double
dividend of using the government’s revenue from CO2 permits for a reduction of the labor tax.
Any tax reform gives – intended or not – rise to redistributive effects and therefore to political
opposition. The opposition against effluent charges arises from sectors that are net-payers of
the environmental tax. As illustrated by the political discussion in Switzerland, opposition
against CO2 taxes is much stronger than against incurring abatement cost. The industrial
sector agreed on ‘voluntary’ emission reduction, provided government refrains from
introducing a tax on carbon use14. Although, voluntary reductions in general will not minimize
total abatement cost, it allows the industrial sector to maintain pollution rights on the
remaining emissions.
With this opposition in mind, we evaluate further tax reforms involving refunding of
government’s revenue from a CO2 tax. These scenarios are subject to the specific political
constraint that no monetary transfers between sectors occur. Such a two-sided tax subsidy
scheme as proposed by Buchanan and Tullock (1975) asks for an intrasectoral redistribution
of environmental tax revenues, while holding the overall tax payments of each sector,
including the household sector, constant.
Table 1: Tax Reform Scenarios
Scenario Tax revenue replacement Political constraint
REF Lump-sum Not fulfilled
WDD Labor Not fulfilled
COCO no tax no revenue Fulfilled
YSUB Sector-by-sector output Fulfilled
LSUB Sector-by-sector labor Fulfilled
The first scenario that fulfills this political constraint is the command-and-control system
(COCO). Firms in every industry as well as households must reduce emissions by a fixed
amount. They are neither compensated nor taxed. This approach constitutes a sector-specific
shadow price on CO2 use, combined with a sector-specific subsidy equal to the value of the
                                                          
14 The Swiss CO2 emissions reduction bill assigns a CO2 tax for the years 2004+, in case the voluntary reductions
will miss the target.
7emissions. This scheme is inefficient because it does not allow for trade in permits across
sectors. The second scenario with the political constraint in place is the YSUB scenario. Here
as in the third scenario, the shadow price of the CO2 standard is uniform across sectors; there
is one price for CO2 permits, and sectors are refunded by a sector-by-sector output subsidy for
the costs of permit purchases. The last scenario refunds the expenditure for permits by a
sector-by-sector labor subsidy (LSUB). For both scenarios, we assume the sectors to be big
enough that on the individual firm level, the subsidy from the government is independent from
the environmental tax payment.
Table 1 gives an overview on the different scenarios with respect to the revenue replacement
and the political restriction. When government chooses the adequate channel for redistributing
revenues of permit sales to sectors and households, two aspects must be considered: the
distortion of existing taxes discussed above and a new distortion that arises due to different
subsidy rates across sectors when refunding the tax yield. With regard to existing distortions,
the taxed factor with the highest marginal excess burden should be chosen for revenue
replacement. However, if such a factor tax is narrowly based, i.e. the cost share of this factor
is small, a sector-by-sector reduction of tax rates induces large factor price differences
between the sectors and, as a consequence, heavily distorts production efficiency. In
particular, Schleiniger and Felder (1998) showed in a (partial equilibrium) two-sector-two-
factor model that a differentiated subsidy of labor is less distorting than a sectoral
differentiation of energy taxes, provided the cost share for labor in both sectors is larger than
for energy. When this condition holds, sector-specific labor subsidies lead to relatively small
differences in the producer price for labor. Hence, the factor price ratios as well as the
technical rates of substitution vary only little and the corresponding distortion of production
efficiency is rather small.
4 The Price of the Political Constraint: Results from a CGEM for Switzerland
4.1 Model Structure
Our analysis of the efficiency of different tax recycling scenarios is based on a static large
scale general equilibrium model of the Swiss economy for the year 1990. Producers and
consumers are perfectly competitive, i.e. they take market prices as given. The following
subsections give an overview of the model structure15.
                                                          
15 See the appendix of Felder and van Nieuwkoop (1996) for an exhaustive description of the model.
8Sectoral Disaggregation
The model features 38 sectors based on the Swiss input-output table (Swiss Federal Office for
Statistics, 1998). With regard to carbon emission constraints, the sectoral disaggregation is
chosen on the basis of carbon intensity, i.e. carbon-intensive sectors are as disaggregated as
possible given the original data sources. To account for different carbon intensities and
substitution possibilities across energy goods, the model identifies six primary and secondary
energy goods: gas, refined oil products such as heavy and light fuel-oil, gasoline and diesel,
and electricity. Table 2 summarizes the sectoral disaggregation.
Table 2: The 38 Sectors of the Swiss input-output table
Agriculture, forestry Leather and leather products Public transportation
Electricity Chemicals Private transportation
Gas Petroleum refining Communication
Water Rubber and plastic products Finance
Food products Non metal minerals Insurance
Beverages Primary and non-ferrous metals Real estate
Tobacco products Machinery, except electrical Consulting
Textile mill products Electrical machinery Education
Textile products Main Construction Health
Wood products, furniture Finishing Construction Domestic economy
Paper and pulp products Wholesale trade Government
Fine paper Retailing Social Security
Printing and publishing Tourism
Production
For each industry i a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function describes the
technological substitution possibilities in production (Y) between capital, labor, energy and
intermediate materials (KLEM). At the highest nest, the composition of intermediate materials
and KLE is fixed:
( ) ( )Y f K L E m m KLEi i i i i i i= =, , , min ,   .
At the next level, the capital-energy composite KE can be traded off with labor, the elasticity
of substitution χ being 0.6:
( )( )KLE KE Li i i i i i= + −α β βχ χ χ1 1   .
Energy can be substituted in the next lower nest with capital. Here, the elasticity of
substitution φ is 0.45:
9( )( )KE K Ei i i i i i= + −δ ε εφ φ φ1 1   .
Finally, energy inputs to sector i production involve an elasticity of substitution between gas,
fossil fuels and electricity η equal to 0.6:
η
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1
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The oil sector features a specific production structure. Here a joint product including the four
oil derivatives gasoline, diesel, and light and heavy fuel-oil is produced using crude oil
(exclusively imported). The elasticity of transformation π is assumed to be 4.0:
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π
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n
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min ,   .
The efficiency parameters of the technology as well as the share parameters of input costs are
calibrated using the 1990 input-output table for Switzerland which includes interindustry
flows, and value added inputs in the 38 sectors.
Household Behavior
Figure 1: The nested CES utility functions
The submodel of households behavior is based on a hierarchical tier structure of decision
problems, as illustrated in figure 1. Each household starts with a budget that equals the rental
value of his capital and labor endowments (whether sold or retained as leisure), plus transfers,
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minus (lump-sum) taxes. At the highest decision level the household divides this income
between present consumption and savings (future consumption) according to a Cobb-Douglas
function.
At the second level of the optimization process, the household chooses the optimal mix of
leisure and consumer goods. The (constant) elasticity of substitution equals 0.8. At the third
decision level, 13 consumer goods are grouped into three composite consumer goods:
transportation, energy goods and other consumer goods. The elasticity of substitution at this
level is 0.6. In the first nest private and public transportation, and in the third nest oil/gas and
electricity are aggregated, the elasticity of substitution being 1.2 in both nests. In the second
nest, the remaining nine consumer goods are traded off according to a unitary elasticity of
substitution. This nesting of the utility function follows standard rules [see Ballard et al
(1985)] except for the fact that commodities with a high carbon content are differentiated
from other consumer goods in two separate nests. The 13 consumer goods are generated by 13
fixed-coefficient technologies transforming the 38 output commodities into 13 consumption
commodities.
Goods Markets
Domestic markets clear, equating aggregate domestic output (D) plus imports (M) to
aggregate demand, where demand adds up from intermediate inputs (m), investment (I),
private consumption (C) plus government consumption (G). Market clearance for non-energy
goods is given by:
( ) iii
j
iijiii GCImaMDA +++= ∑,  .
Factor Markets
We assume perfectly competitive factor markets in which factor prices adjust so that supply
equals demand. Primary factors include labor and capital which are both assumed to be
homogenous and perfectly mobile between sectors but not between countries. Capital supply
is exogenous, as we do not consider a dynamic model.
Government Sectors
The government distributes transfers and provides a public good which is produced with
commodities purchased at market prices. Government expenditure are financed with tax
revenues. The model incorporates the main features of both the Swiss tax and social transfer
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system. Table 3 provides a summary of taxes and transfers. All of our simulations are based
on revenue-neutral tax reforms. This is implemented by keeping the amount of the public
good provision fixed, and recycling any residual revenue lump sum (reference case) or
through the channels that have been described in section 3. There is a budget deficit in the
benchmark which is kept constant in all scenarios (and financed by a lump-sum transfer from
the household).
Table 3: Tax Incidence and Revenue in billion CHF
Tax Instrument Incidence Revenue
Corporate tax Capital 7.46
Income tax Labor 39.91
Income tax Capital 14.94
Indirect production tax Output 4.58
Sales tax Output 9.79
Import tax and duties Imports 4.74
Social security payments Labor 16.11*
Total tax payments 97.53
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Switzerland (1998), own calculations.
* Social security payments indicated represent only those contributions which have the character of a tax.
Contributions for which households receive well-defined services are not included in this amount.
Foreign Trade
Switzerland is a small and open economy. We therefore assume that changes in Swiss import
and export volumes have no effect on terms of trade. Domestic and foreign products are
distinguished by origin according to the Armington assumption. The Armington goods are
aggregated with identical import shares for a given import good across all components of final
and intermediate demand. On the export side, products of the Armington sectors destined for
domestic and international markets are treated as imperfect substitutes, produced subject to a
constant elasticity of transformation (equal to 4.0). Switzerland had a small trade surplus in
1990. This surplus is kept constant in all simulations runs.
4.2 Simulation Results
In presenting the results, we follow the scenarios as presented in table 2. The reference case
(REF) is the scenario where the government transfers revenues from pollution permit lump-
sum to the household. The second scenario (WDD) uses the revenues to finance a reduction in
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the labor tax. As expected, it produces a welfare gain. This so-called weak second dividend of
environmental tax reform equals 0.52 percent in equivalent terms relative to the value of
endowment (total income) in the reference scenario.
The remainder of the scenarios are subject to the political constraints that no intersectoral
redistribution takes place. The command-and-control scenario (COCO) fares badly. The costs,
compared to REF, is 0.83 percent. If we compare it with WDD, the loss in equivalent terms
amounts to 1.35%. It is noteworthy that the model assumes uniform substitution elasticities in
all sectors. If this assumption were relaxed, the marginal abatement cost would substantially
differ across sectors, which in turn would result in even larger welfare losses for COCO.
Table 4: Equivalent Variation in percentage terms  (%EV)
Scenario %EV
REF 0
WDD  0.52
COCO -0.83
YSUB  0.35
LSUB  0.38
According to the simulation results, there are more efficient alternatives to COCO that also
satisfy the political constraint. Subsidizing labor demand and supply on a sector-by-sector
base instead of command-and-control would increase welfare. The welfare gain compared to
REF is 0.38 percent. About the same welfare improvement could be achieved when output
were subsidized. The welfare gains with YSUB and LSUB relative to REF indicate that the
effect of the weak double dividend is stronger that the additional distortion caused by the
sectoral differentiation of labor and output prices, respectively. Comparing YSUB and LSUB,
we conclude that the relative welfare gain form reducing the highly distorting labor tax is
almost offset by a relative large differentiation of producer prices of labor. Both effects can be
explained with the small tax base of labor relative to output.
As table 4 illustrates, there is a price to be paid when environmental tax reform is subject to a
political constraint. In all corresponding scenarios welfare is lower compared to WDD.
However there are large differences. The price of the political constraint, when household and
sectors are compensated for the purchases of CO2 permits via an output or a labor subsidy, is
0.17 percent and 0.14 percent, respectively. In the case of a labor subsidy, this is almost a
magnitude smaller than with a command-and-control scheme.
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5 Summary
The existing as well as the planned measures to curb CO2 emissions in most European
countries do not follow standard economic rules. They are characterized by a number of
exceptions designed to protect energy-intensive sectors. While these exemptions involve
efficiency losses, they are apparently successful in overcoming the political opposition against
effluent charges.
The present paper investigates on alternatives measures that would better solve the tradeoff
between efficiency and political feasibility. We use a computable general equilibrium based
on the Swiss input-output table of 1990. Switzerland’s CO2 goal is a ten percent emission
reduction by 2010. The present law asks sectors to voluntarily reduce emission by the fixed
amount, a policy we interpret as a sector-by-sector command-and-control approach. This
policy forgives the efficiency gain that could be realized if the shadow value of the overall
emission constraint were equalized across sectors. We thus compare the command-and-
control scheme with a CO2 tax accompanied by a sector-by-sector subsidy on labor or output.
Like command-and-control the two scenarios also satisfy the political constraint of no
intersectoral transfers. The simulation results indicate that the two-sided tax-subsidy
arrangements are about 1.2 percent more efficient than command-and-control.
The two alternative scenarios, while equalizing the shadow value of the environmental
constraint, introduce a new distortion in the labor market or in the goods market, as the
subsidy rates differ across sectors. However, the simulations suggest that there are efficiency
gains compared to a situation where accruals from the environmental tax are refunded lump-
sum to the household. Hence the weak double dividend that can be reaped when using
environmental tax revenues to finance cuts in distortionary taxes does not vanish with the
introduction of a political constraint. The efficiency gain compared to the lump-sum reference
scenario is still around 0.35 percent in both alternative scenarios.
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